16 Comments
User's avatar
C. Scala's avatar

I experienced a similar epiphany, though I sometimes forget it in the heat of verbal combat. Maybe a good shorthand for what not to do would be something like: neither a mercenary nor a true believer be.

Random and Incomplete's avatar

So, argue in good faith in service of truth - not in service of personal power?

Colin Wilson's avatar

Very good. Would this be a good way of seeing the difference:

Rationalisation starts with desired outcome and applies emotion to find a logical argument for it.

Reason starts with first principles and is the ability to consider different arguments and find the ones that fit the evidence best, while scanning imperfectly for emotional bias to remove?

Annie Windholz's avatar

"I still think it is absolutely acceptable to be someone who thrives on collaborative conflict and takes pleasure in making strongly critical arguments and in making them persuasive. The issue is not whether we should do that and do it forcefully and take satisfaction in a point hitting home. It is whether we are using that skill in service of what is true and what is consistently principled and whether we are applying the same standards of honesty, consistency and self-scrutiny to our own arguments as we do to those of others."

Great reflection article!

Miguelitro's avatar

Im an appellate lawyer who spent his entire professional career arguing my clients’ positions. So long as the position was legitimately held, I did my level best to ethically defend it. I would have done the same for my clients’ opponents.

What does your article say about me?

Helen Pluckrose's avatar

I’ve said “Because it’s honest” in both answers now. It’s the same principle that makes our academic sting operation different to academic fraud. In the first case, someone is trying to establish whether rigorous academic standards that will detect it are upheld and they reveal this. In the latter, the academic is trying to advance their career with fraudulent data and they are expected not to do that but present what is true.

There are different rules and expectations - different functions and purposes - in play in an intellectual debate and in legal arguments. In the first case, the expectation is that the arguer makes a case because they believe to be true and/or they stand by the principles. They are engaged in collaborative truth-seeking. It’s the court of public opinion for ideas. In the latter case, the defendant is entitled to the best defence anyone can devise even if there is nobody who actually thinks he is innocent. This is a court of law for individuals.

The reason we exempt courts of law from an expectation that the individual advocates will be sincerely motivated by having been convinced by evidence and also willing to change their mind if the opposing evidence is stronger is because it is believed that somebody who is facing serious personal penalties deserves to have someone make the best possible interpretation and framing of the facts for a jury to consider. Ultimately, it’s because that could be true even if nobody is inclined to be that charitable. The jury is then expected to only convict if that case is not plausible enough to leave them without reasonable doubt. The advocate is not held to standards of sincerity because they’re not acting for themselves but for a defendant who deserves to have a strong legal arguer. They can consider themselves to be acting with integrity because they are doing their best to ensure that the most charitable interpretation is considered. Likewise the prosecution can consider themselves to have integrity because they are protecting the public’s interests by ensuring the worst interpretation is considered.

But I see no point in arguing with you. I do that when I assume the other person means what they say and is willing to consider my argument honestly and change his mind if necessary. I also depend on them being honest in order for me to change my mind. You have said you see no difference between these kinds of exchanges where we are collaboratively truth-seeking and legal cases where someone picks a side and sticks with it arguing whatever will defend that side no matter whether it’s backed by evidence or good reasoning or not. That makes attempting to find resolution with you pointless. I’ll leave it here.

Helen Pluckrose's avatar

Nothing because this is honestly done and part of presenting best case and worse case to a jury. I didn’t say anything about that in the piece but did in my initial response.

https://substack.com/@helenpluckrose/note/c-278121429?r=1nm3qt&utm_medium=ios&utm_source=notes-share-action

Miguelitro's avatar

Si what makes it ethical is the presence of a supposedly neutral arbiter with power?

Because I see no principled difference between Gurwinder’s dice example and the randomness of which client approached me first.

Of course I would always refuse to argue frivolous positions. That is no fun and can lead to sanctions.

Helen Pluckrose's avatar

I mean, the coin toss analogy does apply to both scenarios. When it’s a situation where an accused person has a right to the best defence while the prosecution has the responsibility to make the most damning. And when it’s a marketplace of ideas situation in which people should consider themselves to have a responsibility to argue sincerely for what they believe to be true and be prepared to change their mind if presented with evidence they are wrong. But this is because they have different functions and serve different purposes.

But to cover that, we can just say what scenario Lewis was referring to and that it’s not one where a prosecution and defence case do battle with everyone aware that this is what is happening.

My article and Gurwinder’s post and the original quote are all operating in the broader marketplace of ideas sphere.

Miguelitro's avatar

Well your reply still leaves blank the question of what makes contested legal argument different and I have to conclude it’s the presence of an arbiter with power—if the argument is in good faith but still wrong the arbiter’s intervening presence absolves the advocate of some moral responsibility that would be incurred in the arbiter-free marketplace of ideas. I don’t know what else it could be.

By the way years ago I loved your book you wrote on woke ideology with James Lindsay.

I’m very grateful for it!

I

Helen Pluckrose's avatar

No. The fact that it’s honest. We know that a defence case and a prosecution case is being made and how that works. People are knowingly assessing both arguments. The problem would be if you did this in the rest of your life. If you argued for certain political or ethical stances based on what was profitable to you rather than what your most honest evaluation of evidence ‘ consistent application of principles led you to. If you would never admit error or fault or change your mind when given reason to in that scenario or in personal ones like a marriage or friendship.

Miguelitro's avatar

There is a distinction between argument and advocacy on the one hand and factual veracity on the other. Lawyers are ethically barred from presenting facts they affirmatively know are false. But they can argue aggressively for versions of the truth that are unproven to be false, even though they likely are. Lots of criminal lawyers test this limitation to absurd degrees given what’s at stake. In civil practice where I was I did not know too many lawyers who habitually lied to judges. That can really piss them off if they get wind of it.

In non legal argument and debate like on Substack I love arguing hypotheticals of all sorts regardless of their veracity. But social pressure often deters truth and foregrounds demonstrably false propositions to gain status and avoid opprobrium. The role of genetics, as you bring up, is an excellent example. It is scientifically well established that genetics play a role in intelligence (google geneticist Paige Harden) but woe unto the person who makes such a statement in Progressive circles.

Connie McClellan's avatar

I agree that advocating for a legitimate position that might one doesn't personally consider "true" is reasonable and honest (lawyers are speaking in a context where they are expected not to personally believe in the absolute truth of the position they are promoting. This is necessary for justice to work.)

For me, I might advocate for a position I regard as ultimately false in order to understand or explain why others might hold that position (i.e. racism might be an innate consequence of evolved human tribalism). Once that's established we can talk about the existence of anti-racism in society and why *that* is also an element of human society and human personality.

(Helen's ability to analyze what might eventually prove to be false and/or unethical is one reason I enjoyed the book "Cynical Theories".) Those years of rationalization did not go to waste.

Dangerous Dan's avatar

That you’re a hired gun?

Pete Griffiths's avatar

It would be remarkable if a person who subjected their own political positions to rigorous review and encountered positions consistent with their own didn't see such positions as representative of good argument or compelling evidence

User's avatar
Comment deleted
Jun 19Edited
Comment deleted
Connie McClellan's avatar

Don't worry: the recourse here is that any arguments one way or the other, but especially against conversion therapy, will never by completely rational or provable because they are about human psychology; even worse, it's psychology about strong feelings that arise from cultural and personal attitudes about sex and gender (or whatever: that icky stuff whatever we call it.) It's okay to put the arguments over to one side, not pursue rationalism, and vote and support as you feel.

This is based on living through all the arguments about homosexuality back in the day. In spite of backlashes and setbacks, I still have hope that a progressive society will eventually take trans people in stride as just another way to be human.